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Whether Resignation from Service can be Withdrawn before its Acceptance [Judgment]

Service Law - Resignation from service made by a person can be withdrawn before its acceptance by the competent authority and before it takes effect.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON & R.NARAYANA PISHARADI, JJ.

W.A.Nos.2123 of 2016 & 2173 of 2016

Dated this the 14th day of June, 2018 

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 4170/2012 of HIGH COURT OF KERALA DATED 19-09-2016 

APPELLANTS / RESPONDENT NO 6 

SHABEER AHAMMED
BY ADV.KUM.A.ARUNA 

RESPONDENTS/PETITIONER & RESPONDENTS 1 TO 4

1. SIVADASAN V.P.

2. THE MANAGER, AYOOR JAMA ATHUL ISLAMIA AIDED UPPER PRIMARY SCHOOL, UPPALA P.O, KASARGOD 671 322.
3. THE HEADMASTER, AYOOR JAMA ATHUL ISLAMIA AIDED UPPER PRIMARY SCHOOL, UPPALA P.O, KASARGOD 671 322.
4. THE HEADMASTER, AYOOR JAMA ATHUL ISLAMIA AIDED UPPER PRIMARY SCHOOL, UPPALA P.O, KASARGOD 671 322.
5. THE ASSISTANT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, MANJESWAR, P.O UPPALA 671 322, KASARGOD DISTRICT.
6. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION, KASARAGOD 671 121.
R1 BY ADV. SRI.M.SASINDRAN R2-R3 BY ADV. SRI.KALEESWARAM RAJ R BY SRI.K.M.ABDUL MAJEED BY SR.GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI.P.N.SANTHOSH 


JUDGMENT

R. Narayana Pisharadi, J 

Resignation from service made by a person can be withdrawn before its acceptance by the competent authority and before it takes effect. This is a basic and general principle of law. Factual and legal intricacies of the resignation from service made by a person who was working as a peon in an aided school form the subject matter of consideration in these two writ appeals filed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.4170/2012.
2. Sri.Sivadasan.V.P, the writ petitioner, was appointed as Peon in the Ayyoor Jama-athul Islamia Aided Upper Primary School at Uppala as per Ext.P1 order dated 01.11.2008 issued by the Manager of the school. His appointment was approved by the Assistant Educational Officer (AEO) on 16.02.2009. He was declared to have satisfactorily completed his period of probation on the afternoon of 31.10.2009. His appointment as a peon was confirmed on 01.11.2009.
3. Ext.P2 charge memo dated 26.07.2011 was served on the writ petitioner alleging that he committed various acts of indiscipline and dereliction of duty. The writ petitioner gave a reply dated 08.08.2011 to the charge memo. On 17.11.2011, the writ petitioner tendered Ext.P3 letter of resignation to the Manager of the school. In this letter, he stated that he was voluntarily resigning from service from the afternoon of 17.11.2011. The Manager accepted the resignation and submitted it to the AEO concerned. However, on 18.11.2011, the writ petitioner sent Ext.P4 letter to the AEO withdrawing his resignation. He stated in Ext.P4 letter that he tendered the letter of resignation to the Manager under threat and coercion. On 18.11.2011 itself, the writ petitioner sent Exts.P5 and P5(a) letters to the District Educational Officer and the Deputy Director of Education respectively narrating the circumstances under which he tendered the letter of resignation from service to the Manager of the school. The AEO summoned the writ petitioner for a personal hearing to be held on 08.12.2011. The writ petitioner sought adjournment of the hearing on various grounds and the hearing was adjourned from time to time to several dates for one reason or other but the writ petitioner did not participate in the personal hearing. Ultimately, as per Ext.P10 order dated 27.12.2011, the AEO granted approval for the acceptance of the resignation of the writ petitioner by the Manager of the school and also ratified the action of the Manager in relieving the writ petitioner from service with immediate effect.
4. Sri.Sivadasan filed W.P.(C) No.4170/2012 seeking the following reliefs: 

“i) call for the records leading to the issuance of Ext.P10 and quash the same by issue of certiorari; 

ii) call for the records leading to the appointment of 6th respondent as Peon in Ayyoor Jama-athul Islamia Aided Upper Primary School in the place of the petitioner and quash the same by issuing writ of certiorari; 

iii) issue a writ of mandamus, any other writ, order or direction commanding the respondents 1 to 5 to re-appoint the petitioner as Peon, Ayyoor Jama-athul Islamia Aided Upper Primary School, Uppala with all service benefits; 

iv) declare that the Ext.P10 order passed by the 3rd respondent is absolutely without jurisdiction since the petitioner has withdrawn the Ext.P3 resignation letter; 

v) declare that the Ext.P3 resignation letter is not liable to be given effect since the same has not been approved by the Educational Authorities as on 18-11-2011, the date on which the petitioner has withdrawn the Ext.P3 resignation letter; 

vi) declare that the relieving of the petitioner from the post of Peon is illegal since the previous approval of the Educational Authority has not been obtained; vii) issue a writ of mandamus, any other writ, order or direction commanding the respondents 3 to 5 to conduct an enquiry on the basis of Exts.P4, P5 and P5(a); 

viii) declare that the appointment of the 6th respondent is illegal and improper; 

ix) award cost to the petitioner 

x) issue any other writ order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case;” 

5. The first and the second respondents in the writ petition, the Manager and the Headmaster of the school, filed counter affidavit denying the allegation that resignation letter was procured from the writ petitioner under threat and coercion. They contended that the letter of resignation was given by the writ petitioner voluntarily and it was written by him in his own handwriting in the presence of witnesses. They further contended that the writ petitioner did not forward the letter of withdrawal of resignation to the Manager of the school who is the appointing authority. They also contended that the resignation of the petitioner came into effect immediately on acceptance of the same by the Manager of the school.
6. The third respondent in the writ petition, the Assistant Educational Officer, filed a counter affidavit stating that the Manager has the authority to accept the letter of resignation and on 17.11.2011 he had accepted it with immediate effect and that the petitioner sent the letter of withdrawal of resignation only on 18.11.2011. The third respondent also contended that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to participate in the enquiry conducted by him but he did not participate in the enquiry and thereafter Ext.P10 order was issued after observing all formalities.
7. The learned Single Judge of this Court found that the Manager could not have accepted the letter of resignation given by the writ petitioner and relieved him from service without obtaining the prior approval of the educational authority. It was also found that the AEO ought not to have granted approval for accepting the resignation since the writ petitioner had resiled from his offer to resign from service. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge quashed Ext.P10 order to the extent it granted approval for the acceptance of the resignation of the writ petitioner by the Manager with effect from 17.11.2011 and ratification of the action of the Manager in relieving the writ petitioner with effect from 17.11.2011. It was declared that the petitioner shall be deemed to have continued in service with effect from 17.11.2011 and that he shall be entitled to all consequential benefits that flow from such a declaration. Consequently, the appointment of the sixth respondent (in the writ petition) made in the vacancy caused due to the relieving of the writ petitioner was also quashed. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the sixth respondent in the writ petition has filed W.A.No.2123 of 2016 and the Manager and the Headmaster of the school, the first and the second respondents in the writ petition, have filed W.A.No.2173 of 2016.
8. We have heard Smt.A.Aruna, learned counsel for the appellant in W.A.No.2123 of 2016, Sri.Varun C.Vijay, the learned counsel for the appellants in W.A.No.2173 of 2016 and also Sri.M.Sasindran, learned counsel for the second respondent/writ petitioner. We have also heard Sri.P.N.Santhosh, the learned Government Pleader.
9. Admittedly, the writ petitioner had tendered Ext.P3 letter of resignation to the Manager of the school on 17.11.2011. In Ext.P3, he has stated that he was voluntarily resigning from service with effect from the afternoon of 17.11.2011. Ext.P3 letter of resignation contains the endorsement of the Manager of the school accepting the resignation on 17.11.2011 and submitting it to the AEO for approval. Admittedly, the writ petitioner had sent Ext.P4 letter to the AEO on 18.11.2011 withdrawing the resignation.
10. The writ petitioner has got a contention that Ext.P3 letter of resignation was tendered by him not voluntarily but under threat and coercion. There are circumstances to infer that this allegation made by the writ petitioner is highly probable. It is pertinent here to note that disciplinary proceedings were pending against the writ petitioner pursuant to Ext.P2 charge memo issued to him. In the reply dated 08.08.2011 given by the writ petitioner to the charge memo, he had denied the allegations made against him but he had assured the management that he shall be sincere and obedient in his work and conduct. The letter of resignation tendered by him on 17.11.2011 has to be considered in that context. The letter of resignation is seen attested by four witnesses. It is rather unusual and strange that a letter of resignation from service is attested by witnesses. It is revealed from Ext.P10 order issued by the AEO that the Manager of the school had submitted before the AEO during the enquiry that two brothers of the writ petitioner were present when the writ petitioner prepared the resignation letter and tendered it. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants that 17.11.2011 was not a holiday. Admittedly, the letter of resignation was tendered by the writ petitioner at the office of the Manager of the school. It was very unusual to have the brothers of the writ petitioner summoned to the school on a working day to witness the preparation of the resignation letter by him. These circumstances would indicate that there was some element of compulsion on the writ petitioner to submit resignation letter to the Manager. The presence of the brothers of the writ petitioner at the time of tendering the resignation letter is rather inexplicable. It was as if there was a conscious attempt made by the management of the school to make it appear that the resignation of the writ petitioner was voluntary.
11. In P.Kasilingam v. P.S.G.College of Technology: AIR 1981 SC 789, the facts were more or less similar. The appellant in that case, while he was on probation as a Lecturer in the Department of Electronics in P. S. G. College of Technology, Coimbatore,was subjected to a departmental enquiry for dereliction of duty and irresponsible conduct. The enquiry against him was scheduled to commence at 9.00 a.m on March 19, 1976. On that day, at 8.30 a.m, that is, just when the departmental enquiry was about to commence, the appellant tendered a letter of apology and also a letter of resignation. The letter of apology submitted by him was virtually an admission of guilt and contained a promise that he would reform in future and give no further cause for complaint. The letter of resignation submitted along with the written apology signified his intention to resign from service with effect from 19th September, 1976 and his request to relieve him from that date. The Principal accepted the resignation by making endorsement at the foot of the letter of resignation but directed that the appellant as desired by him be relieved from duties with effect from September 19, 1976. He further directed that the enquiry into the charges levelled against the appellant be dropped. On April 5, 1976, the Principal, however, issued a relieving order dispensing his services forthwith on payment to him salary for a period of six months by a cheque. On appeal, the Government found that the letter of resignation submitted by the appellant was not voluntary. The Government, accordingly, allowed the appeal and directed the reinstatement of the appellant with immediate effect. The respondent challenged the impugned order of the Government by a writ petition. The High Court quashed the order of the Government. Dealing with the facts of the case, the Apex Court observed as follows: 
“There is no manner of doubt that the circumstances attendant upon the submission of the letter of resignation and the letter of apology on March 19, 1976 are somewhat strange. The manner in which the letter of resignation was obtained from the appellant on that day at 8.30 a.m. together with his letter of apology, just before the departmental enquiry was to commence at 9.00 a.m, clearly suggests that they were integral parts of the same transaction. It was somewhat unusual for a delinquent officer to be called to the residence of the Correspondent of College along with the Principal and to have the two documents signed by him, as a condition for dropping the enquiry. It appears that the submission of letter of apology, which virtually amounted to an admission of guilt, along with the unconditional letter of resignation, was part of a deal between the management and the appellant. It was meant to act as an inducement for the enquiry not to be proceeded with. One is left with the unfortunate impression that the management wanted to dispense with the services of the appellant. The Government was, therefore, justified in holding that if the appellant placed in such circumstances submitted his resignation, it would not necessarily give rise to an inference that his act in doing so was voluntary”.
The Apex Court proceeded further and held as follows: 
“The finding reached by the Government does not necessarily mean that the letter of resignation was obtained from the appellant under coercion. It may well be that the appellant was acting under an element of compulsion for he had become a victim of the situation brought about by the holding of a departmental enquiry and if the appellant placed in such circumstances submitted a letter of resignation it would not necessarily give rise to an inference that his act in doing so was voluntary”.
12. True, in the aforesaid case the Supreme Court has held that the High Court had transgressed its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution by entering upon the merits of the controversy by embarking upon an enquiry into the facts as to whether or not the letter of resignation submitted by the appellant was voluntary and that the question at issue as to whether the resignation was voluntary was a matter of inference to be drawn from other facts. In the instant case, we do not venture upon to conduct an enquiry as to whether the resignation was voluntary or not. The conclusion reached by us earlier that the resignation tendered by the writ petitioner appears to be not voluntary is only an inference possible from the admitted and undisputed facts.
13. Even if it is accepted that the letter of resignation was tendered by the writ petitioner voluntarily, the fact remains that the resignation was withdrawn by him on the very next day. In this context, we shall advert to the relevant provisions contained in the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). Rule 48 of Chapter XIVA of the Rules provides that no teacher shall be relieved before the expiry of the term of appointment without the previous approval of the Educational Officer. Rule 7 of Chapter XXIVB of the Rules deals with appointment, probation, transfer etc of the non-teaching staff of a school. It states that the rules regarding appointment, transfer from one educational agency to another educational agency or transfer under the same educational agency, discipline, maintenance of service records, confirmation, promotion, seniority and maintenance of seniority list contained in Chapter XIVA applicable to teachers of aided school shall mutatis mutandis apply to the non-teaching staff in aided schools.
14. A Division Bench of this Court in Manager, St.Georges High School v. Joy Paul : 2002(1) KLT 691 has held that the expression appointment in Rule 7 in Chapter XXIVB of the Rules would take in all incidents of service including termination of service, relieving of a teacher on resignation etc. The Division Bench has further held that relieving of a peon from a school without the previous approval of the Educational Officer is illegal.
15. A reading of Rule 48 in Chapter XIVA of the Rules conjointly with Rule 7 in Chapter XXIVB of the Rules would show that a non-teaching staff in an aided school can be relieved from service only with the previous approval of the educational authority. The statute has made it mandatory that no teacher shall be relieved before the expiry of the term of appointment without the previous approval of the AEO. This provision is applicable to a non-teaching staff also in view of Rule 7 in Chapter XXIVB of the Rules. Discharge, relief and resignation would be effective only on approval of the educational authorities. So long as no previous approval is obtained from the educational authorities, discharge, relief or resignation would not come into effect. Mere fact that the Manager is the appointing authority does not mean that once he accepts the letter of resignation, it would come into effect. As the appointing authority, he may receive the letter of resignation and give his approval but that approval has no legal consequence unless and until the educational authority grants approval to the resignation (See Hyderali v. State of Kerala : 2001 (1) KLT 763).
16. In the instant case, admittedly, the writ petitioner had tendered the letter of resignation from service on 17.11.2011. On the very day the Manager of the school accepted the resignation. The counter affidavit filed by the AEO in the writ petition reveals that the letter of resignation was received by him on 18.11.2011. Admittedly, on 18.11.2011, the writ petitioner had sent a letter to the AEO withdrawing the letter of resignation from service. Ext.P10 order granting approval for the acceptance of the resignation of the writ petitioner by the Manager of the school and ratifying the action of the Manager in relieving the writ petitioner with immediate effect was issued only on 27.12.2011. On any day prior to the date 27.12.2011 the writ petitioner was entitled to withdraw his resignation because acceptance of the resignation by the Manager of the school would have come into effect only on the date of Ext.P10 order. Ext.P10 order passed by the AEO ratifying the action of the Manager in relieving the writ petitioner from service without his previous approval is clearly invalid and illegal.
17. In Raj Kumar v. Union of India : AIR 1969 SC 180, the Supreme Court has held as follows: 
“Where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus poenitentiae but not thereafter”


(emphasis supplied).
18. In Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra: AIR 1978 SC 694, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held as follows: 
“It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a "prospective" resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resignor. This general rule is equally applicable to Government servants and constitutional functionaries. In the case of a Government servant or functionary who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service/or office, normally, the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office tenure terminated, when it is accepted by the competent authority” 


(emphasis supplied).
19. In Moideenkutty Haji v. State (ILR 1981 (1) Kerala 488), the effect of resignation from service made by the Headmaster of a school and subsequent withdrawal of the resignation made by him was considered. In that case, on 05.07.1977, the Headmaster sent a letter of resignation to the Manager of the school stating that he was resigning from the post from 01.08.1977. On 05.07.1977 itself the Manager accepted the resignation. But on 28.07.1977, the Headmaster sent a letter to the Manager withdrawing the resignation. The Assistant Educational Officer issued an order dated 01.08.1977 approving the resignation from the post of Headmaster with effect from 01.08.1977. The short point that arose in that case was whether the Headmaster could withdraw his resignation before it took effect even though the Manager of the school accepted the resignation before the same was withdrawn. Relying upon Rule 48 in Chapter XIVA of the Rules, it was held that the resignation of an aided school teacher can take effect only with the concurrence of the Educational Officer and since the Headmaster had withdrawn his resignation before obtaining such concurrence, acceptance of the resignation could not become effective.
20. A complete and effective act of resigning from office is one which severs the link of the resignor with his office and terminates its tenure. Where effectiveness of a resignation depends upon acceptance of the same by the proper authority it can always be withdrawn until accepted because the resignation is not complete in the eye of law (See Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra: AIR 1978 SC 694). Unless the employee is relieved of the duty, after acceptance of the offer of voluntary retirement or resignation, jural relationship of the employee and the employer does not come to an end (See Power Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia: (1997) 4 SCC 280). Resignation which depends for its effectiveness upon the acceptance by the proper authority is like an offer which may be withdrawn before it is accepted. Where a resignation given by a government servant is dependent for its effectiveness on the acceptance by the appropriate authority, the government servant concerned has an unqualified right to withdraw the resignation until the same is accepted by the authority. A resignation submitted by an employee is no resignation in the eye of law until it is accepted by the employer as per the rules. So long as it is not an effective resignation, there can be no bar to withdraw it.
21. In the instant case, though the Manager of the school accepted the resignation of the writ petitioner on 17.11.2011 itself, as per the Rules, previous sanction of the AEO was necessary for relieving him from service. The sanction from the AEO in the form of Ext.P10 order was given only on 27.12.2011. The writ petitioner had withdrawn his letter of resignation on 18.11.2011 itself, long before the resignation became effective. There was no valid termination of his service by the acceptance of his letter of resignation by the Manager of the school.
22. The appellants have got a contention that the writ petitioner should have forwarded the letter withdrawing the resignation to the Manager of the school who is the appointing authority and not directly to the AEO. The Manager had forwarded the letter of resignation to the AEO on 17.11.2011 itself. The stand of the writ petitioner was that the letter of resignation was obtained from him under threat and coercion. Therefore, it is probable that he would have thought it fit to send the letter withdrawing the resignation to the AEO directly especially when he wanted to inform the AEO the circumstances under which the letter of resignation was obtained from him by the Manager. At any rate, the fact that the letter withdrawing the resignation from service was directly sent to the AEO cannot be a ground to find that the withdrawal of resignation was not valid.
23. The appellants have also got another plea that the writ petitioner had equally efficacious alternative remedy by filing an appeal or revision before the appropriate authority as provided under the Kerala Education Act, 1958 or the Rules and therefore, the writ petition filed by him is not maintainable. The normal rule is that if alternative statutory remedies are available, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be entertained. But this rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not of compulsion. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge has exercised his discretion in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and disposed of it on merits. At this distance of time, it will not be proper for us, in appeal, to direct the writ petitioner to approach the statutory authority for redressing his grievance.
24. The learned Single Judge has declared that the writ petitioner shall be deemed to have continued in service with effect from 17.11.2011 and that he shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the writ petitioner is not entitled to backwages on the principle of “no work, no pay”.
25. The principles regarding payment of backwages to a person who is ordered to be reinstated in service have been enumerated by the Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya: (2013) 10 SCC 324. The Apex Court has stated as follows: 
The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. Denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments”.
After a survey of the entire precedents in the field on the issue, the Apex Court has culled out the propositions in them in Deepali Gundu(supra). Three among those propositions are the following: 
''i) In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. ii) The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the Court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. iii) Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the Court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averments about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments”.
26. In the instant case, termination of the services of the writ petitioner was done in violation of the statutory rules. The financial capacity of the employer is not an issue here. The appellants have got no plea that the writ petitioner was gainfully employed and that he was getting salary equal to the salary he was drawing prior to the termination of service. Therefore, there is no sufficient ground to interfere with the direction of the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioner shall be deemed to have continued in service with effect from 17.11.2011 and that he shall be entitled to all consequential benefits.
27. Learned counsel for the appellant in W.A.No.2123 of 2016 would submit that the salary and emoluments already paid to him may not be ordered to be recovered. No direction in that regard has been made by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, it is not an issue that needs consideration in the writ appeal. If the authorities take steps for recovery of the salary and emoluments already paid to the appellant in W.A.No.2123 of 2016, he is at liberty to challenge such proceedings before the appropriate forum.
28. Before concluding, we deem it fit to remind the public authorities the words of wisdom spoken to by the Apex Court in Balram Gupta v. Union of India: AIR 1987 SC 2354 as follows: 
“In the modern and uncertain age it is very difficult to arrange one's future with any amount of certainty, a certain amount of flexibility is required, and if such flexibility does not jeopardize Government or administration, administration should be graceful enough to respond and acknowledge the flexibility of human mind and attitude and allow the appellant to withdraw his letter of retirement in the facts and circumstances of this case. Much complications which had arisen could have been thus avoided by such graceful attitude. The court cannot but condemn circuitous ways "to ease out" uncomfortable employees. As a model employer the government must conduct itself with high probity and candour with its employees”.
29. In the aforesaid circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Consequently, the writ appeals are dismissed. No costs.
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