Criminal P.C. 1973 - S. 482 - Penal Code, 1860 - Ss 279, 337 & 338 - Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 - S. 185 - Driving by a drunken person or by a person under the influence of drugs - Whether the FIR in such like cases can, in fact, be quashed on the basis of compromise - Though the State has expressed its slight reservation regarding compounding of the offence but I find that this is not such wherein the offence for which the petitioner has been charged can be stricto sensu held to be the offence against the State. Even otherwise, once respondent No.2 has compromised the matter, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and the continuation of the criminal case against the petitioner would put the petitioner to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case.
Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
Cr. MMO No. 454 of 2018.
Date of decision: 08.10.2018.
Lomesh …..Petitioner.
Versus
State of H.P. and Anr. ….. Respondents.
For the Petitioner : Mr. T. K. Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr.Vinod Thakur and Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar,
Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Bhupinder Thakur, Deputy Advocate
General, for respondent No.1 .
Mr. Gurudev Negi, Advocate, for respondent No. 2.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (Oral).
This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(for short ‘Code’) has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing of FIR No.
111/2017, dated 02.07.2017, registered at Police Station, Rampur-Bushehar,
District Shimla, H.P. under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and and
Section 185 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 on the basis of compromise entered
into between the petitioner-accused and respondent No. 2-complainant.
2. Brief
facts of the case are that respondent No. 2 has filed a complaint case bearing
FIR No. 111 of 2017, registered at Police Station Rampur-Bushehar, District
Shimla, H.P. under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 185 of the Motor
Vehicle Act, 1988 on 02.07.2017.
3. The
petitioner and respondent No. 2 are present and have been identified as such by
their learned counsels.
4. It is
stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that the parties are friends and
have compromised the matter as per Annexure P-2 annexed to the petition.
5. However,
the moot question is whether the FIR in such like cases can, in fact, be
quashed on the basis of compromise.
6. The
issue in question has been extensively dealt with by the Bench of Hon’ble three
Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10
SCC 303, wherein
the relative scope of inherent power of High Court under Section 482 to quash
criminal proceedings of non-compoundable offences in view of the compromise
arrived at between the parties have been considered extensively. Discussing
different provisions and taking into consideration the different decisions rendered
by it, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
“61. The position that
emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High
Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.
Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to
be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure
the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In
what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised
where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed.
However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to
the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed
even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences
under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide
for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But
the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the
offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to
dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category
of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because
of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction
is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by
not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and
compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue
with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between
the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s)
is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding.” (emphasis supplied)
7. The judgment in Gian’s Singh case (supra), in turn, was considered subsequently by another Bench of Hon’ble
three Judges of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai
Bhimsinhbhai vs. State of Gurjar and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641, wherein after taking into consideration the various provisions
of law as also the various judgments including the one rendered in Gian Singh’s case
(supra), certain broad
principles that emerged from the precedents came to be summarised in the
following propositions:
16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the
subject, may be summarised in the following propositions :
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice.
Theprovision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves
powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash
a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the
same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an
offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by
the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The
power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is
noncompoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482,
the High Courtmust evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise
of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii)
to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information
Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have
settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences
involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have
settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature
but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial
in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil
dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the
inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial,
financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially
civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility
of aconviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would
cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions
(viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic
well- being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere
dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in
declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a
financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
8. Adverting
to the facts, it would be noticed that the offences, which the
petitioner-accused had committed do not in any manner fall within the exception
as carved out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh and
Parbatbhai’s cases (supra).
9. Though
the State has expressed its slight reservation regarding compounding of the
offence but I find that this is not such wherein the offence for which the
petitioner has been charged can be stricto sensu held
to be the offence against the State. Even otherwise, once respondent No.2 has
compromised the matter, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
the continuation of the criminal case against the petitioner would put the
petitioner to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused
to him by not quashing the criminal case.
10. Keeping in view the aforesaid guidelines, it is not disputed that
the parties have reached a settlement and on that basis have preferred the
present proceedings seeking quashment of the FIR. Once respondent No.2 states
that he has compromised the matter and, therefore, he does not want to pursue
the instant FIR, the quashing of such FIR would definitely be to secure the
ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of the Court.
11. Thus, taking holistic view of the matter and looking into all
attending facts and circumstances, I find this to be a fit case to exercise
powers under Section 482 of the Code and accordingly FIR No.111 of 2017, dated
02.07.2017, registered at Police Station, Rampur-Bushehar, District Shimla,
H.P. under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 185 of the Motor
Vehicle Act, against the petitioner, is quashed.
12. The petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
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