20 Important Supreme Court Judgments March 15, 2019

1. S. Sreesanth v. Board of Control for Cricket in India

The order dated 13.09.2013 of the disciplinary committee only to the extent of imposing sanction of life time ban is set aside.

The disciplinary committee of the BCCI may reconsider the quantum of punishment/sanction which may be imposed on the appellant as per Article 6 of the Anti-Corruption Code. The appellant may be given one opportunity to have his say on the question of quantum of punishment/sanction.



Disciplinary Inquiry - The standard of proof in a disciplinary inquiry and in a trial of a criminal case are entirely different. In a criminal case it is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt wherein in disciplinary inquiry under Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI the preponderance of probability is to serve the purpose.

Sports Law - The sports occupy a prominent place in life of a man/woman and also in the life of a nation. It not only gives physical or moral strength to a personality but spread the message of goodwill and friendship. In the 21st Century the countries have come closer and nearer to each other and sports have become a medium of bonds.

Sports Law - Cricket, it is said, is a synonym for gentlemanliness which means discipline, fair play, modest and high standard of morality. The ever increasing interest in the game of Cricket in our country has raised issues of its regulation, control and management. In our country the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), a registered Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, exercises sufficient control on all aspects of game of Cricket and has framed various Code of Conduct for all who are associated with it.

Facts of the Case


The present is an appeal filed by an acclaimed cricketer of India against whom proceedings were drawn by BCCI and a life ban was imposed on the appellant by the BCCI which was unsuccessfully challenged before the Kerala High Court and aggrieved by the Division 4 Bench judgment of the High Court the appellant has filed this appeal.

Case Number : C.A. No. 2424 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Krishnamohan K. 
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. M. Joseph


2. P. Subramaniyan v. Union of India

Service Law - It was for the employee to know the rule. The department was not expected to advise and/or tell the employee about how the seniority will be fixed and/or about the rota­quota rule.



Case Number : C.A. No. 7779 of 2012 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Rakesh K. Sharma
Respondent's Advocate : A. Venayagam Balan
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah

3. Nandlal v. State of Maharashtra

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 read with Section 34 - Murder - Life Imprisonment - Scope of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC - Whether the accused has made out a case for modification of his conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC instead of Section 302 IPC ?

In order to bring the case within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, the following conditions enumerated therein must be satisfied:- (i) The act must be committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion; (ii) upon a sudden quarrel; (iii) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage; and (iv) the accused had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Even if the fight is unpremeditated and sudden, if the weapon or manner of retaliation is disproportionate to the offence and if the accused had taken the undue advantage of the deceased, the accused cannot be protected under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.

Facts of the Case




The deceased abused the appellant who got annoyed and first attacked Lakhichand and on seeing this, Gopichand gave a stick blow on the head of the appellant and thereafter, the appellant went to his house situated next door and came back with a gupti. Inflicting injury on the deceased is part of the same incident and cannot be said to be a different part to hold that the act was premeditated and intentional. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant, the incident was in a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. One of the conditions of Exception 4 is that the offender ought not to have taken the “undue advantage” or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The appellant inflicted a single blow injury with gupti on the left armpit which pierced through the upper end of the left arm and then entered the chest causing fracture of fourth rib and reached till the lung causing rupture of left lung vasculature. Though, the gupti was a dangerous weapon, the appellant-accused caused a single injury which pierced into the lung. Having sustained a stick blow from Gopichand-PW-1, in the sudden quarrel and in the heat of passion, the appellant inflicted the injury on deceased Lakhichand. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, the case falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. The conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 302 IPC is liable to be modified as Section 304 Part II IPC.

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 510 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Dinesh Chandra Pandey
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi

4. Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd. v. Shree Lal Meena

Service Law - Pension - It would be inadvisable to expand such beneficial schemes beyond their contours to extend them to employees for whom they were not meant for by the Legislature. 

There are some observations on the principles of public sectors being model employers and provisions of pension being beneficial legislations. We may, however, note that as per what we have opined aforesaid, the issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle. When the Legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular date and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it by implication. The provisions will have to be read as they read unless there is some confusion or they are capable of another interpretation. We may also note that while framing such schemes, there is an important aspect of them being of a contributory nature and their financial implications. Such financial implications are both, for the contributors and for the State. Thus, it would be inadvisable to expand such beneficial schemes beyond their contours to extend them to employees for whom they were not meant for by the Legislature. [Para 25]

Voluntary retirement and Resignation - Difference Between - Voluntary retirement is a concept read into a condition of service, which has to be created by a statutory provision, while resignation is the unilateral determination of an employer-employee relationship, whereby an employee cannot be a bonded labour. [Para 22]

The Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 - the definition of ‘retirement’ envisages two eventualities – first a person who had retired in terms of the Staff Regulations; and secondly, a voluntary retirement under the provisions of the Pension Rules themselves.

The Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 - Rule 23 - Forfeiture of Service - Resignation entails forfeiture of the entire past service and consequently would not qualify for pensionary benefits.

The Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 - Rule 31 - ‘Pension on voluntary retirement’ - which is admissible on completion of 20 years of qualifying service, with a notice of not less than 90 days in writing.

Interpretation of Statutes - Statutory provisions must be given their clear meaning unless there is ambiguity in the wordings.

What is most material is that the employee in this case had resigned. When the Pension Rules are applicable, and an employee resigns, the consequences are forfeiture of service, under Rule 23 of the Pension Rules. In our view, attempting to apply the Pension Rules to the respondent would be a self-defeating argument. As, suppose, the Pension Rules were applicable and the employee like the respondent was in service and sought to resign, the entire past service would be forfeited, and consequently, he would not qualify for pensionary benefits. To hold otherwise would imply that an employee resigning during the currency of the Rules would be deprived of pensionary benefits, while an employee who resigns when these Rules were not even in existence, would be given the benefit of these Rules. [Para 19]

Case Number : C.A. No. 14739 of 2015 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : D.N. Goburdhan
Respondent's Advocate : Ansar Ahmad Chaudhary
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Hon'ble Ms. Justice K.M. Joseph
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul

5. M. Venkateswara Rao v. Andhra Bank Represented By Its Chairman Managing Director

Case Number : C.A. No. 3138 - 3141 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Pratibha Jain
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Hon'ble Ms. Justice K.M. Joseph
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul

6. Sadanand Puthran v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.

Case Number : C.A. No. 10904 of 2016 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Christi Jain
Respondent's Advocate : Mohit Paul
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Hon'ble Ms. Justice K.M. Joseph
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul

7. Meg Raj (dead) Through Lrs. v. Manphool (dead) Thr. Lrs.

The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Section 9 - The Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Section 26 - Bar of Jurisdiction - Section 26 (b) of the Act clearly bars filing of civil suit to examine the legality of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority under the Act. In other words, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is expressly taken away by Section 26(b) of the Act from examining the legality of orders passed under the Act. The remedy of the plaintiffs in such case lies in filing appeal/revision under Section 18 of the Act against the order of the Prescribed Authority.

Case Number : C.A. No. 7426 of 2011 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Kailash Chand
Respondent's Advocate : K.K. Mohan
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

8. Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India

The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971

Case Number : C.A. No. 5574 of 2009 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : E.C. Agrawala
Respondent's Advocate : Anil Katiyar
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

9. Rafiq Ahmedbhai Paliwala v. State of Gujarat

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 392, 395 and 397 - Quashing of FIR - The High Court instead of quashing the FIR at such a preliminary stage should have directed the IO to make proper investigation on the basis of the FIR and then file proper charge sheet on the basis of the material collected in the investigation accordingly. It was, however, not done. It was more so because, the FIR did disclose prima facie allegations of commission of concerned offences.

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 506 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Taruna Singh Gohil
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

10. Rohitbhai J Patel v. State of Gujarat

The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 118 and 138 - In the scheme of the NI Act, mere creation of doubt is not sufficient. 

On perusing the order of the Trial Court, it is noticed that the Trial Court proceeded to pass the order of acquittal on the mere ground of 'creation of doubt'. We are of the considered view that the Trial Court appears to have proceeded on a misplaced assumption that by mere denial or mere creation of doubt, the appellant had successfully rebutted the presumption as envisaged by Section 139 of the NI Act. [Para 20]

The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 118 and 138 - Basic ingredients for drawing of presumption.

For determination of the point as to whether the High Court was justified in reversing the judgment and orders of the Trial Court and convicting the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, the basic questions to be addressed to are two-fold: as to whether the complainant had established the ingredients of Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, so as to justify drawing of the presumption envisaged therein; and if so, as to whether the accused-appellant had been able to displace such presumption and to establish a probable defence whereby, the onus would again shift to the complainant?

So far the question of existence of basic ingredients for drawing of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 the NI Act is concerned, apparent is that the accused-appellant could not deny his signature on the cheques in question that had been drawn in favour of the complainant on a bank account maintained by the accused for a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs each. The said cheques were presented to the Bank concerned within the period of their validity and were returned unpaid for the reason of either the balance being insufficient or the account being closed. All the basic ingredients of Section 138 as also of Sections 118 and 139 are apparent on the face of the record. The Trial Court had also consciously taken note of these facts and had drawn the requisite presumption. Therefore, it is required to be presumed that the cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheques i.e., the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the accused-appellant to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption. [Para 14]

The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 118 and 138 - Preponderance of probabilities.

On the aspects relating to preponderance of probabilities, the accused has to bring on record such facts and such circumstances which may lead the Court to conclude either that the consideration did not exist or that its nonexistence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that the consideration did not exist. This Court has, time and again, emphasized that though there may not be sufficient negative evidence which could be brought on record by the accused to discharge his burden, yet mere denial would not fulfil the requirements of rebuttal as envisaged under Section 118 and 139 of the NI Act.

The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 118 and 138 - The aspect relevant for consideration had been as to whether the accused has brought on record such facts / material / circumstances which could be of a reasonably probable defence.

In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the Trial Court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused. This approach of the Trial Court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused-appellant. The aspect relevant for consideration had been as to whether the accused-appellant has brought on record such facts/material/circumstances which could be of a reasonably probable defence. [Para 17]

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 508 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Taruna Singh Gohil
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari

11. Sugreev Kumar v. State of Punjab

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302, 307, 341, 34 - The Arms Act, 1959 - Sections 25, 54 and 59.

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 319 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence - Degree of satisfaction required for invoking the powers under Section 319 CrPC - Principles. 

The provisions contained in Section 319 CrPC are to achieve the objective that the real culprit should not get away unpunished. By virtue of these provisions, the Court is empowered to proceed against any person not shown as an accused, if it appears from evidence that such person has committed any offence for which, he could be tried together with the other accused persons.

The provisions contained in Section 319 CrPC sanction the summoning of any person on the basis of any relevant evidence as available on record. However, it being a discretionary power and an extraordinary one, is to be exercised sparingly and only when cogent evidence is available. The prime facie opinion which is to be formed for exercise of this power requires stronger evidence than mere probability of complicity of a person. The test to be applied is the one which is more than a prime facie case as examined at the time of framing charge but not of satisfaction to the extent that the evidence, if goes uncontroverted, would lead to the conviction of the accused.

Facts of the Case


Pending further cross-examination of the appellant, an application under Section 319 CrPC was filed by the prosecution to summon 8 persons to face trial on the basis of the testimony of the appellant (PW-1), wherein, he had asserted that all of them were present at the crime scene; 3 and had assaulted and injured the appellant, his family members and associates on exhortation by Krishan Dev, which resulted in the demise of his father and brother. Hence, it was submitted that there was sufficient material on record to summon all the aforesaid persons to face the trial in this case. The prayer of the prosecution for proceeding against other accused persons, having not been examined in the proper prospective and with due regard to the applicable principles, deserves to be restored for reconsideration of the Trial Court.

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 509 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Ashok Kumar Gupta Ii
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari

12. Union of India v. All India Trade Union Congress

Constitution of India - Article 226 - It is not the function of the Courts to frame any Scheme but it is the sole prerogative of the Government to do it.

All that the High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution, can do is to direct the Government to consider for framing an appropriate Scheme having regard to the facts and circumstances of any case but not beyond it. It is only in an exceptional case where the Court considers it proper to issue appropriate mandatory directions it may do so but not otherwise. [Para 16 & 17]

Case Number : C.A. No. 3146 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Arvind Kumar Sharma
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

13. Harveer Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 323, 324, 452, 504 and 506 - Revision - The least that was expected of was that the High Court will apply its judicial mind to the factual and legal aspects arising in the case and then pass appropriate orders either for upholding the conviction or acquitting the appellants, as the case may be. We find that the High Court failed to do this and hence interference is called for.

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 505 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Keshav Ranjan
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

14. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax 8 v. M/s Yes Bank Ltd.

The Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 35­D - Whether the Bank is an industrial undertaking so as to entitle them to claim deduction under Section 35­D of the Act.

The main issue involved in this appeal was with regard to the applicability of Section 35­D of the Act to the Bank. It was, however, not decided. The High Court should have framed the substantial question of law on the applicability of Section 35­D of the Act in addition to other questions and then should have answered them in accordance with law rather than to leave the question(s) undecided. It was brought to our notice that the issue with regard to applicability of Section 35­D of the Act to the Bank is already pending consideration before the High Court at the instance of the respondent in one appeal. If that be so, both the appeals, should be decided together.

Case Number : C.A. No. 3148 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Anil Katiyar
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

15. Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Kodali

Guardians & Wards Act, 1890 – Divorce and custody battles can become quagmire and it is heart wrenching to see that the innocent child is the ultimate sufferer who gets caught up in the legal and psychological battle between the parents.

The eventful agreement about custody may often be a reflection of the parents’ interests, rather than the child’s. The issue in a child custody dispute is what will become of the child, but ordinarily the child is not a true participant in the process. While the best interests principle requires that the primary focus be on the interests of the child, the child ordinarily does not define those interests himself or does he have representation in the ordinary sense.  [Para 52]

The Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015 - Section 2 (9) - The expression “best interest of child” which is always kept to be of paramount consideration is indeed wide in its connotation and it cannot remain the love and care of the primary care giver, i.e., the mother in case of the infant or the child who is only a few years old. [Para 43]

The Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015 - Section 2 (9) - The definition of “best interest of the child” is envisaged in Section 2(9) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015, as to mean “the basis for any decision taken regarding the child, to ensure fulfilment of his basic rights and needs, identify, social wellbeing and physical, emotional and intellectual development”. [Para 43]

Guardians & Wards Act, 1890 – The crucial factors which have to be kept in mind by the Courts for gauging the welfare of the children equally for the parent’s can be inter alia, delineated, such as (1) maturity and judgment; (2) mental stability; (3) ability to provide access to schools; (4) moral character; (5) ability to provide continuing involvement in the community; (6) financial sufficiency and last but not the least the factors involving relationship with the child, as opposed to characteristics of the parent as an individual. [Para 49]

Custody of Minor Child – Foreign Courts – Return the child to the foreign jurisdiction - The doctrines of comity of courts, intimate connect, orders passed by foreign courts having jurisdiction in the matter regarding custody of the minor child, citizenship of the parents and the child etc., cannot override the consideration of the best interest and the welfare of the child and that the direction to return the child to the foreign jurisdiction must not result in any physical, mental, psychological, or other harm to the child.

Taking a holistic consideration of the entire case, we are satisfied that all the criteria such as comity of courts, orders of foreign court having jurisdiction over the matter regarding custody of the children, citizenship of the spouse and the children, intimate connect, and above all, welfare and best interest of the minor children weigh in favour of the respondent (Sobhan Kodali) and that has been looked into by the High Court in the impugned judgment in detail. That needs no interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [Para 51]


Younger Tender Year Doctrine

While dealing with the younger tender year doctrine, Janusz Korczar a famous Polish­Jewish educator & children’s author 51 observed “children cannot wait too long and they are not people of tomorrow, but are people of today. They have a right to be taken seriously, and to be treated with tenderness and respect. They should be allowed to grow into whoever they are meant to be ­ the unknown person inside each of them is our hope for the future.” Child rights may be limited but they should not be ignored or eliminated since children are in fact persons wherein all fundamental rights are guaranteed to them keeping in mind the best interest of the child and the various other factors which play a pivotal role in taking decision to which reference has been made taking note of the parental autonomy which courts do not easily discard. [Para 50]

Guardians & Wards Act, 1890 – The child’s psychological balance is deeply affected through the marital disruption and adjustment for changes is affected by the way parents continue positive relationships with their children. To focus on the child rights in case of parental conflict is a proactive step towards looking into this special situation demanding a specific articulation of child rights. [Para 53]

Guardians & Wards Act, 1890 – The judicial resolution of a custody dispute may permanently affect or even end the parties’ legal relationship but the social and psychological relationship will usually continue and it seems appropriate that a negotiated resolution between the parents is preferable from the child’s perspective for several reasons. A child’s future relationship with each of his parents may be better maintained and his existing relationship is less damaged by a negotiated settlement than by one imposed by a court after adversarial proceedings. [Para 54]

Guardians & Wards Act, 1890 – Parents are not only caretakers, but they are instrumental in the development of their child’s social, emotional, cognitive and physical well­being and work harmoniously to give their children a happy home to which they are justly entitled to.

The best interest of the children being of paramount importance will be served if they return to US and enjoy their natural environment with love, care and attention of their parents including grandparents and to resume their school and be with their teachers and peers. In the present case, there is every possibility that the parties may reconcile and start over their relationship afresh, at least for the sake of happiness of their own off­spring if for no other reason. The parties are indeed mature and sensible enough to understand that the ordinary wear and tear of married life has to be put up in within the larger interests of their own happiness and of the healthy, normal growth and development of their offspring, whom destiny has entrusted to their joint parental care. Spouses must come over the temperamental disharmony which usually exists in every marriage, rather than magnifying it with impulsive desires and passions. Parents are not only caretakers, but they are instrumental in the development of their child’s social, emotional, cognitive and physical well­being and work harmoniously to give their children a happy home to which they are justly entitled to. We hope and trust that the parties will forget and forgive their differences and join hands together in providing the congenial atmosphere which may be good not for themselves but also for the development of their minor children. [Para 55 & 56]

Case Number : C.A. No. 3135 - 3136 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Lakshmi Raman Singh
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi

16. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Vijay Kumar @ Pappu

The Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 307 / 34 and 326 - The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 357 and Section 357­A - Acid Attack - Compensation - the victim had suffered an uncivilised and heartless crime committed by the respondents and there is no room for leniency which can be conceived. A crime of this nature does not deserve any kind of clemency. This Court cannot be oblivious of the situation that the victim must have suffered an emotional distress which cannot be compensated either by sentencing the accused or by grant of any compensation.

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 753 of 2010 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Abhinav Mukerji
Respondent's Advocate : Jaspreet Gogia
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi

17. Dauwalal @ Ganesh Devangan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh)

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 323, 342 and 450 - Unlawful Assembly - In a crime committed by an unlawful assembly by principle of vicarious liability, every member of the unlawful assembly would be guilty of the offence, even if he himself had not done the actual act. But the facts must indicate with clarity that such person was in fact a member of the unlawful assembly. [Para 10]

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 478 - 479 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Navin Prakash
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit

18. P. Bandopadhya v. Union of India

The Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Rule 37 (1) - Pension on absorption in or under a corporation, company or body - a Government servant who is absorbed in a Corporation or Government Company is deemed to have retired from government service on the date of his/her absorption. [Para 8.1]

The Appellants having voluntarily exercised the option to get absorbed in the regular service of VSNL, were deemed to have retired from the service of the Central Government on the date of their absorption i.e. January 2, 1990 as per Rule 37(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.

The Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Rule 3(q) - To receive pensionary benefits from the Government, a Government servant is required to put in a minimum ‘qualifying service’.

The Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Rule 3(q) - ‘Qualifying Service’ means the service rendered while on duty or otherwise which shall be taken into account for the purpose of Pensions and Gratuities admissible under Rules.

The Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Rule 49 (1) and (2) - a Government servant is entitled to receive pension on retirement only after the completion of the qualifying service of 10 years. On the other hand, a Government servant who retires before completing the qualifying service of 10 years is entitled to service gratuity.

The Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Rule 49 - Amount of Pension.

A conjoint reading of the statutory rules, i.e. Rule 37 with Rule 49 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, would make it abundantly clear that the Appellants were not entitled to pensionary benefits since admittedly they did not have the minimum qualifying service of 10 years, to make their service pensionable with the Central Government. On absorption in VSNL on January 2, 1990 there was a severance of their service with the Central Government. The Appellants would be entitled to the retiral benefits under VSNL. After exercising the option to be absorbed in VSNL, the Appellants are now estopped from seeking pensionary benefits from the Central Government. The Appellants were not entitled to receive pensionary benefits either under the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 or under Clauses (a) and (b) of the Office Memorandum.

Facts of the Case


The case of the Appellants being Government servants prior to their absorption in VSNL, with less than 10 years of qualifying service, would be squarely covered by Clause (c) of the Office Memorandum. Under Clause (c), they would be entitled to receive an amount equal to the Provident Fund contribution for the period of their service under the Government, upto the date of their permanent absorption along with Simple Interest at 6% per annum as the opening balance in their CPF account with the Public Sector Undertaking/Autonomous Body. In view of the aforesaid findings, the present Civil Appeal is dismissed.

Case Number : C.A. No. 3149 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : S.K. Verma
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra
Judgment By : Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra

19. Sr. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices v. Gursewak Singh

The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Section 4(1)(b) - Gratuity would be payable to an employee even on his resignation. Thus, any rule barring payment of gratuity to an employee who resigns, would be contrary to Section 14 read with Section 4(1)(b) of the 1972 Act.

The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Sections 1 (3) and 14 - The Department of Posts, Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct & Engagement) Rules, 2011 - Rule 3­A, 6 (1) and (13) - The Department of Posts, Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011 - Terms and Conditions of Engagement - Payment of ex­gratia gratuity - No gratuity to ED Agent who quits the agency on his own - Act to override other enactments, etc.


Whether a Gramin Dak Sewak is an ‘employee’ as per Section 2(e) of the 1972 Act, and is entitled to payment of Gratuity under this Act ?


Section 2(e) of the 1972 Act, however specifically excludes persons who are governed by any Act, or Rules providing for payment of Gratuity. Section 2(e) of the 1972 Act excludes persons who hold a post with the Central or State Government and are governed by any other Act or rules providing for payment of gratuity. Gramin Dak Sewaks are engaged as Extra Departmental Agents, a post governed by the 2011 Rules. These Rules have a separate provision for payment of Gratuity to the Extra Departmental Agents. A Gramin Dak Sewak is not an “employee” under the 1972 Act.

Whether a Gramin Dak Sewak is eligible for payment of Gratuity under the 2011 Rules upon voluntary resignation ?


The Order was passed under Rule 6(13) permitting Respondent No. 1 to quit the services of the Gramin Dak Sewak as per his voluntary resignation. As a consequence of his resignation, Respondent No. 1 became disentitled from the payment of Gratuity under the statutory 2011 Rules applicable to Gramin Dak Sewaks.

A reading of Rule 3­A(iii) of the 2011 Rules, makes it abundantly clear that a Gramin Dak Sewaks must have an independent means of livelihood. The Gramin Dak Sewaks are engaged on a part­time basis for a maximum of 3 to 5 hours a day. Rule 3­A(v) and (vi) stipulate that a Gramin Dak Sewak shall be outside the Civil Service of the Union, and shall not claim to be at par with the servants of the Government.

The Department of Posts, Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011 - Under the amended 2011 Rules the term “employment/appointment” has been replaced by “engagement”. The amended Rule 6 pertains to payment of ex gratia Gratuity to Gramin Dak Sewaks.

Case Number : C.A. No. 3150 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Gurmeet Singh Makker
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Indu Malhotra

20. Bateswari Dayal Mishr Shiksha Samiti v. Madhya Pradesh Nurses Registration Council

Education Law - Whether the appellant institution had applied to the respondent no. 1, Madhya Pradesh Nurses Registration Council within the last date, which was 22nd December, 2018 or not, and if so applied, whether the same was complete in all respects.

The respondent no. 1 has categorically stated that the online application form submitted by the appellant was incomplete and no supporting documents were attached with the same. The appellant has not filed any proof to show that it had given all required particulars in the online application form. In the absence of the copy of the writ petition having been filed before this Court, it cannot be ascertained as to whether there was any such averment made even in the writ petition. It has also not been stated by the appellant institution that the requisite documents were filed along with the application form (which is categorically stated by the respondent no. 1 to be incomplete). The very fact that the certificate of affiliation was issued in favour of the appellant institution by the Madhya Pradesh Medical Science University, Jabalpur, on 02.02.2019, which was much after the last date for submission of the online application form, would make it clear that the said document of affiliation was not even available with the appellant institution at the time of filing of the online application form.

Case Number : C.A. No. 3137 of 2019 15-03-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Usha Nandini. V
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vineet Saran
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vineet Saran
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