8 Important Supreme Court Judgments May 6, 2019

1. The State of Haryana v. Sandeep Singh

The Haryana School Education (Group C) State Cadre Service Rules, 2012 - Rule 9 (5) - Trained Graduate Teacher (TGT) and Classical & Vernacular (C&V) Cadre Teachers - The TGTs are engaged to provide elementary education. The purpose of the Rules is better served by ensuring education to the students of primary schools in the State by Trained Graduate Teachers rather than C&V Teachers who were being engaged earlier. It is upgradation of qualification of teachers to be engaged for teaching the students of the primary schools for appointment as TGTs. Therefore, the interpretation which sub serves cause of education is to be preferred as against the interpretation leading to anomalous result, more so it is not warranted by the cumulative reading of the 2012 Rules.



Case Number : C.A. No. 4546 of 2019 06-05-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Vishwa Pal Singh
Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta


2. Rambir v. State of NCT Delhi

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Exception 4 to Section 300 - Unless it is barbaric, torturous and brutal, strangulation cannot be said to be an act of extreme cruelty for denying the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.

The iron rod (saria) is picked up at the spur of the moment at the time of incident and used to compress the neck forcefully. In that view of the matter it is nothing but an act committed by the appellant in a heat of passion. Further, the High Court has not given the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC on the ground that appellant compressed his wife’s neck also depicts an act of extreme cruelty. Having regard to nature and manner of incident it cannot be said that act of the appellant was extremely cruel. Unless it is barbaric, torturous and brutal, strangulation of the appellant’s wife cannot be said to be an act of extreme cruelty for denying the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 839 of 2019 06-05-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Shiv Kumar Suri
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy

3. Jiten K. Ajmera v. M/s Tejas Co Operative Housing Society

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLI Rule 27 - Consumer Complaint - Application for permission to file additional documents after the filing of the Appeal before the State Commission - Held, the State Commission was in error by rejecting the Application by merely stating that the documents are “not necessary”. The said Order is an unreasoned one. The State Commission must have taken a holistic view of the matter.

These documents are of relevance to establish that the Appellants are not in a position to obtain the Occupancy Certificate from the MCGM until the unauthorized structures, which are in violation of the approved plans, are removed. In the absence of these documents, the Appellants would not be in a position to substantiate their case that they are unable to obtain the Occupancy Certificate, and comply with the directions issued by the District Forum. The National Commission has by the Impugned Order dated 16.03.2018 affirmed the Interim Order passed by the State Commission. The matter is remitted to the State Commission to take the additional documents on record, and decide the Appeal on merits in accordance with law.


The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLI Rule 27 - A party can produce additional evidence at the appellate stage, if it establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within its knowledge, or could not even after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by it at the time when the decree appealed against was passed.

Referred Case : A. Andisamy Chettiar v. A. Subburaj Chettiar, (2015) 17 SCC 713

Case Number : C.A. No. 4628 of 2019 06-05-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : P.N. Puri
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra

4. Randhir Kaur (d) through her Lrs. v. Balwinder Kaur

Property Law - Suit for possession of the land and Declaration - Exchange of the property of the School - The exchange was illegal and unauthorized, since there was no Resolution passed by the Education Society.

The purported oral exchange dated 01.08.1988, followed by the Agreement dated 25.08.1988, between Balwant Singh, the then Principal of the Doaba Public School, with Mohinder Singh ­ the President of the School, was a wholly collusive and illegal transaction. The exchange was illegal and unauthorized, since there was no Resolution passed by the Doaba Education Society which was running the school in favour of the President to exchange the land owned and vested in the School pursuant to the Gift Deed. The Principal and the President of the school in Garhshankar entered into this collusive transaction, whereby Balwant Singh ­ the then Principal became the owner of the suit property. The school could not have been divested of the ownership of the suit property by the so­called exchange mentioned above. This was in complete breach of faith and trust by the President of the Society and Principal of the School.


Case Number : C.A. No. 4629 - 4630 of 2019 06-05-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Tina Garg
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra

5. The State of Odisha v. Dhirendra Sundar Das

Service Law - Recruitment Process - The Orissa Administrative Service, Class II (Recruitment) Rules, 1978 - The Orissa Administrative Service, Class – II (Appointment by Promotion and Selection) Regulations, 1978 - The Orissa Administrative Services (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2011 - The Orissa Revenue Service (Recruitment) Rules, 2011

The Judgment of the Division Bench is liable to be set aside since the contesting Respondents did not have a vested or fructified right of promotion to OAS Class II posts which had arisen during the recruitment year 2008. The names of the contesting Respondents were merely recommended for consideration. In the meanwhile, in 2009 the State had re­structured the cadre, and abolished the OAS Class II cadre. The re­constituted cadre viz. the Orissa Revenue Service Group ‘B’ cadre came in its place. Hence, the direction of the Division Bench to appoint the contesting Respondents in the vacancies which had occurred in the abolished cadre, in accordance with the repealed 1978 Rules, was contrary to law, and liable to be set aside.

The Constitution of India - Article 141 - Special Leave Petition - the dismissal of a S.L.P. in limine simply implies that the case before this Court was not considered worthy of examination for a reason, which may be other than the merits of the case. Such in limine dismissal at the threshold without giving any detailed reasons, does not constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent.


Case Number : C.A. No. 4646 of 2019 06-05-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Ravi Prakash Mehrotra
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra

6. Karnataka Housing Board v. K.A. Nagamani

The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 21 (b) - a Revision Petition was not maintainable against the Order passed by the State Commission in an appeal arising out of execution proceedings.

The nature of execution proceedings is materially different from the nature of proceedings for adjudication of a consumer complaint. Execution proceedings are independent proceedings. Orders passed for enforcement of the final order in the Consumer dispute, cannot be construed to be orders passed in the ‘consumer dispute’. Execution proceedings even though they are proceedings in a suit, cannot be considered to be a continuation of the original suit. Execution proceedings are separate and independent proceedings for execution of the decree. The merits of the claim or dispute, cannot be considered during execution proceedings. They are independent proceedings initiated by the decree holder to enforce the decree passed in the substantive dispute. There is no remedy provided under Section 21 to file a Revision Petition against an Order passed in appeal by the State Commission in execution proceedings. Section 21(b) does not provide for filing of a Revision Petition before the National Commission against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 25 (3) - Enforcement of orders of the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission - An Order passed for enforcement, would not be an order in the ‘consumer dispute’ since it stands finally decided by the appellate forum, which has conclusively determined the rights and obligations of the parties.

The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Sections 21 (b) and 25 (3) - Jurisdiction of the National Commission - Revision - “Appellate Jurisdiction” and “Revisional Jurisdiction” - Distinction between.

Question of Law

Whether a Revision Petition is maintainable before the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (NCDRC) against an Order passed by the State Commission in an execution proceeding ?


The right to file a Revision Petition, like an appeal, is a right conferred by statute. In the absence of a statutory conferment, there is no inherent right to file a revision. The National Commission has : (i) original jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of goods or services exceeds rupees one crore; (ii) jurisdiction to entertain appeals against Orders of any State Commission; and (iii) supervisory jurisdiction over any State Commission in any “consumer dispute” pending or decided by a State Commission, which is challenged on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/S. 21(b) by the National Commission is limited to a consumer dispute which has been filed before the State Commission. The jurisdiction u/S. 21(b) of the 1986 Act can be exercised by the National Commission only in case of a “consumer dispute” filed before the State Commission. The National Commission in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction u/S. 21(b) is concerned about the correctness or otherwise of the orders passed by the State Commission in a “consumer dispute”. A Revision Petition has a narrower scope than an ‘appeal’. Ordinarily, the power of revision can be exercised only when illegality, irrationality, or impropriety is found in the decision making process of the fora below. The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission u/S. 21(b) is with respect to a pending or disposed of ‘consumer dispute’ before the State Commission.

Facts of the Case

In the present case, the National Commission committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining the Revision Petition filed by the Appellant – Board against an appeal filed before the State Commission, in Execution proceedings. The National Commission erroneously allowed the Revision Petition u/S. 21(b) which was not maintainable.

Referred Case : P.S. Sathappan (Dead) by Lrs. v. Andhra Bank Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 672

Case Number : C.A. No. 4631 of 2019 06-05-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Shailesh Madiyal
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra

7. Raja Singh v. State of U.P.

The UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Service Rules 2001 - Rules 3 (h), 3 (k)  and 5 - ‘Member of the Service’ - ‘Substantive Appointment’ - Though Rules 2001 is silent about the appointment of the appellants prior to coming into force of 2001 Rules, the appellants having been appointed on the post of District Minority Welfare Officer prior to coming into force of Service Rules 2001, cannot be deprived of their rights of absorption in the Minority Welfare Department.

Rule 5 of the UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Service Rules 2001 contemplated that 75% post of District Minority Welfare Officer will be filled up through Public Service Commission by direct recruitment and 25% by promotion through Public Service Commission from amongst substantively appointed Chief Waqf Inspectors and Senior Waqf Inspectors who have completed ten years’ service as Chief Waqf Inspector or 10 Senior Waqf Inspector or both.


The point falling for consideration is that the appellants having been selected and appointed as District Minority Welfare Officer prior to coming into force of UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Rules 2001, can it be said that the appellants were only on deputation and that they have no legal right to claim absorption as District Minority Welfare Officer. Be it noted that at the time of appointment of the appellants, there were no Service Rules. The appellants having been appointed prior to coming into force of UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Rules 2001, their appointment cannot be said to be on deputation. Though it is stated that their appointment was only temporary, there is nothing on record to show that the posts were only temporary posts for a fixed time. In the absence of any material to show that the appellants were appointed only against temporary posts created only for a period of two years, it cannot be held that they were appointed only against temporary posts for a period of only two years.

Case Number : C.A. No. 4642 of 2019 06-05-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Anu Gupta
Respondent's Advocate : Vinay Garg
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi

8. Tejaswini Gaud v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari

The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 - Sections 6, 13 - Maintainability of the writ of habeas corpus - It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the custody of the minor will be determined in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus.

In child custody matters, the ordinary remedy lies only under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the Guardians and 14 Wards Act as the case may be. In cases arising out of the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by whether the minor ordinarily resides within the area on which the court exercises such jurisdiction. There are significant differences between the enquiry under the Guardians and Wards Act and the exercise of powers by a writ court which is of summary in nature. What is important is the welfare of the child. In the writ court, rights are determined only on the basis of affidavits. Where the court is of the view that a detailed enquiry is required, the court may decline to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the parties to approach the civil court. It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the custody of the minor will be determined in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus. [Para 19]

Custody of the child – Removed from foreign countries and brought to India - there is a significant difference in so far the children removed from foreign countries and brought into India.

Facts of the Case

In the present case, the appellants are the sisters and brother of the mother Zelam who do not have any authority of law to have the custody of the minor child. Whereas as per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the first respondent-father is a natural guardian of the minor child and is having the legal right to claim the custody of the child. The entitlement of father to the custody of child is not disputed and the child being a minor aged 1½ years cannot express its intelligent preferences. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the father, being the natural guardian, was justified in invoking the extraordinary remedy seeking custody of the child under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.


The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 - Sections 6, 13 - Maintainability of the writ of habeas corpus - In child custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that the detention of a minor child by a parent or others was illegal and without any authority of law.

Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or examine the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus proceedings is a medium through which the custody of the child is addressed to the discretion of the court. Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is an extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued where in the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary remedy provided by the law is either not available or is ineffective; otherwise a writ will not be issued. In child custody matters, the power of the High Court in granting the writ is qualified only in cases where the detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody. In view of the pronouncement on the issue in question by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in our view, in child custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that the detention of a minor child by a parent or others was illegal and without any authority of law. [Para 18]

The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 - Sections 6, 13 - Maintainability of the writ of habeas corpus - The detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody is treated as equivalent to illegal detention for the purpose of granting writ, directing custody of the minor child. 

Writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective means of immediate release from an illegal or improper detention. The writ also extends its influence to restore the custody of a minor to his guardian when wrongfully deprived of it. The detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody is treated as equivalent to illegal detention for the purpose of granting writ, directing custody of the minor child. For restoration of the custody of a minor from a person who according to the personal law, is not his legal or natural guardian, in appropriate cases, the writ court has jurisdiction. [Para 13]

The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 - Sections 6 and 13 - Natural Guardian - Welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration.

Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 enacts as to who can be said to be a natural guardian. As per Section 6 of the Act, natural guardian of a Hindu Minor in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property) is the father, in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl and after him, the mother. Father continues to be a natural guardian, unless he has ceased to be a Hindu or renounced the world. Section 13 of the Act deals with the welfare of a minor. Section 13 stipulates that in the appointment or declaration of any person as guardian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor shall be the paramount consideration. Section 13(2) stipulates that no person shall be entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the provisions of the Act if the court is of opinion that his or her guardianship will not be for the welfare of the minor. [Para 10]

The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 - Sections 6 and 13 - The welfare of the child has to be determined owing to the facts and circumstances of each case and the court cannot take a pedantic approach. 


In the present case, the first respondent has neither abandoned the child nor has deprived the child of a right to his love and affection. The circumstances were such that due to illness of the parents, the appellants had to take care of the child for some time. Merely because, the appellants being the relatives took care of the child for some time, they cannot retain the custody of the child. It is not the case of the appellants that the first respondent is unfit to take care of the child except contending that he has no female support to take care of the child. The first respondent is fully recovered from his illness and is now healthy and having the support of his mother and is able to take care of the child. [Para 34]

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 838 of 2019 06-05-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Liz Mathew
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi

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